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ABSTRACT 
This study is the first to empirically examine stock market manipulation on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. The dataset contains 40 cases of market manipulation from 
1996 to 2009 that were successfully prosecuted by the Hong Kong Securities & 
Futures Commission. Manipulation is found to negatively impact market efficiency 
measures such as the bid-ask spread and volatility. Markets appear incapable of 
efficiently responding to the presence of manipulators and are characterised by 
information asymmetry. Manipulators were successfully able to raise prices and exit 
the market. This finding contradicts views that trade-based manipulation is entirely 
unprofitable and self-deterring. The victimisation of information-seeking investors and 
the market as a whole provides a strong rationale for all jurisdictions, including 
Australia, to have effective laws that prohibit manipulation and for robust enforcement 
of those laws to further deter market manipulation. 
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1. What is Market Manipulation?  
Market manipulation is among the oldest and most harmful practices in global share 
markets. It victimises individual investors, erodes public confidence in market 
integrity and undermines market efficiency. By creating artificial, false or misleading 
stock prices, manipulators harm legitimate traders who are forced to transact at 
distorted levels that do not efficiently reflect corporate value. Manipulation harms 
market efficiency by disrupting with the process by which prices reflect the market 
forces of supply and demand.  
 Market manipulation has long been recognised as harmful although there is 
little empirical evidence supporting this concern. By demonstrating the negative 
impact of actual cases of market manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(HKSE), this study assists in building a rationale for why securities regulators must 
continue to actively strive to prohibit market manipulation.   
 Defining manipulation is no simple task. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines ‘manipulate’ as ‘to manage by dexterous contrivance or influence; especially 
to treat unfairly or insidiously for one’s own advantage.’ Market manipulation is not 
defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or the CAP 571 Securities and Futures 
Ordinance (Hong Kong). Laws prohibiting manipulation generally describe 
manipulation as involving the creation of ‘artificial’ or ‘false’ market prices yet the 
meaning of such prices is a matter of sharp controversy (Goldwasser 1999, p.100). 
The absence of a statutory definition has led to a lack of agreement amongst courts 
and commentators as to what precisely constitutes manipulation. The effectiveness of 
the law must be called into question if manipulation cannot be defined with precision.  
 Attempts to define manipulation must adequately distinguish manipulation 
from legitimate trading. Jarrow (1992 p.311) defined a manipulative trading strategy 
as one ‘that generates positive real wealth with no risk’. This definition is 
unsatisfactory as it could easily define many legitimate arbitrage activities. Arbitrage 
is similarly defined as a ‘zero-risk, zero-net investment strategy that still generates 
profits.’ (Bodie, Ariff, Rosa, Kane & Marcus 2007). According to the efficient market 
hypothesis that Fama (1970) famously asserted, arbitrage trading may be seen as 
economically desirable given that it improves the efficiency of the pricing of assets 
that are traded on multiple markets.  
 Some clarity may be gained by defining manipulation as fraud. ‘False’ trading 
falls easily within the conceptual confines of fraud as such trading involves deceptive 
trading designed to fool ordinary investors. One example of a ‘false’ trade is a wash 
trade in which the manipulator buys and sells the same security in a trade that 
involves no change in beneficial ownership. Wash trades intentionally mislead 
ordinary investors into a mistaken belief that the stock is more actively traded than it 
Gerace, Chew, Whittaker & Mazzola | Stock Market Manipulation HKSE 
 
 107
really is. Wash trades involve both fraudulent conduct (false trade itself) and a 
fraudulent purpose (to give a false impression to the market).  
 The usefulness of defining manipulation as fraud breaks down when 
examining other types of market manipulation. Manipulation may encompass a 
transaction that has both a willing buyer and seller but is transacted solely for an 
illegitimate purpose. For example, as in the case of ASIC v Soust [2010] FCA 68, an 
executive bought shares at excessively high prices from willing counterparties in 
order to push the price of shares up to qualify for a performance bonus. While these 
trades were not conducted in good faith, they involved no fraudulent conduct as the 
trading was not, by itself, fraudulent. The reason why the conduct is considered 
manipulative is that the illegitimate purpose colours the otherwise legitimate trading 
as manipulative. In his classic judgement on market manipulation, Mason J noted in 
North v Marra Developments (1981) 148 CLR 42, 59 that in the ‘absence of 
revelation of their true character (these transactions) are seen as transactions reflecting 
genuine supply and demand’. Professor Loss, invariably described as the Father of 
modern securities law, has noted that manipulation is ‘related to the field of fraud – 
but not altogether a part of it as a matter of legal analysis’ (Loss & Selgman 2004).  
 The definitional and enforcement challenges of market manipulation led 
Fischel and Ross (1991) to claim that the legal concept of ‘market manipulation’ 
should be abandoned altogether. They claimed that non-fraud based manipulation, 
where the manipulator attempts to move prices to artificial levels solely by trading 
will not be successful due to symmetrical price pressure effects (1991, p.519). They 
conclude that the law need not prohibit such sure-to-lose manipulation that must 
always be unprofitable and entirely self-deterring (1991, p.553).  
 Even if trade-based manipulation is unprofitable, this does not support Fischel 
and Ross’s claim that manipulation involves no harmful outcome. By distorting the 
price-formation process, even if there is a genuine and willing counterparty, 
manipulation gives a false price signal to ordinary investors who believe the price 
reflects genuine supply and demand. If it is argued that only all market forces 
(whether in good faith or not) can give a correct price, it is worth recalling that the 
laws of conspiracy, attempts and other crimes demonstrate the criminal law is 
concerned with more than just harmful acts.  
 Recently the High Court of Australia, for the first time, considered the modern 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) anti-manipulation provision in Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Cth) v JM (2013) 298 ALR 615. The full court declined to narrow the 
application of the law to particular manipulative techniques and merely restated the 
prevailing understanding that artificial prices are prices that exist contrary to the 
forces of ‘genuine’ supply and demand. The key determinant of ‘genuine’ supply and 
demand is that buyers seek to acquire at the lowest available price and sellers seek to 
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sell at the highest realisable price [at 71]. This alone would be insufficient to 
adequately distinguish manipulator from genuine trader. But the court went on to note 
that a manipulator must have the dominant purpose of establishing such an artificial 
price [at 75]. This acknowledgement validates many commentators’ view (such as 
Loke 2007 and Huang 2009) that the vital defining characteristic of a manipulator is 
having an illegitimate purpose or intent. Accordingly this paper adopts this 
understanding of market manipulation as involving an interference with the forces of 
genuine supply and demand for an illegitimate purpose. What this definition fails to 
do is provide industry with certainty as to what precisely manipulation entails. In our 
fast-paced and evolving financial markets who defines what practices as illegitimate?  
 Further guidance may be obtained by the from the United States (‘U.S.’) 
position. The U.S. is the pre-eminent securities law jurisdiction possessing the largest 
stock exchange in the world, a sophisticated jurisprudence on market manipulation 
and an acknowledged reputation for dealing effectively with abusive market practices. 
Australia and Hong Kong have adopted in a piecemeal fashion many of the laws of 
the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (U.S.) relating to market manipulation. This 
legislation was enacted by the Roosevelt administration following the 1929 NYSE 
market crash and resulting worldwide Great Depression. The enactment of these laws 
was designed to protect the public interest beyond the suppression of mere fraud.  
 The US Supreme Court has stated, in Santa Fe Industries Inc v Green that the 
word ‘manipulative’ is virtually a ‘term of art’ reflecting Congress’s intention ‘to 
prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate 
securities’ (430 U.S. 462, 477 [1977]). In giving rule-making authority to the SEC to 
define practices as manipulation it appears that Congress regarded ‘manipulation as a 
flexible concept which would encompass schemes that might hatch in the future from 
the fertile and creative brains of dishonest market operators’ (Poser 1986 p.672). The 
merits of flexibility notwithstanding, there must be a core definition of manipulation.   
While manipulation is difficult to define, some manipulative practices are 
readily identifiable. Manipulative trading techniques are known by a whole manner of 
colourful descriptions such as ‘wash trading’, ‘pump and dump’ and ‘churning and 
burning’ to name a few. Manipulation need not necessarily involve any trading at all. 
The practice of rumourtage involves spreading false or misleading rumours about 
company value in order create artificial or false stock prices. Amid the carnage of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) for example, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) became concerned that negative and untrue rumours were being 
fabricated and spread by entities that had large short positions in the market. By 
pushing prices further down than they ought to go, the corporate regulator was 
concerned that manipulators may have attempted to capture illegitimate profits.  
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While this paper exclusively examines share market manipulation, 
manipulation of other markets obviously also occurs. The historic manipulations of 
the commodities like soybeans and silver have slipped into industry folklore for their 
audacity. More recently financial markets have been shocked at the revelations and 
extent of the manipulation of the benchmark interest rate, the London Interbank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR), a rate which underpins $350 trillion in globally traded derivatives. To 
date, three large investment banks have been fined hundreds of millions of dollars for 
their part in the manipulation of LIBOR and criminal proceedings against individual 
traders have commenced.  
It is the ready transferability of securities on exchanges that makes such 
markets highly susceptible to manipulative techniques. As global equity markets 
increase in complexity, there is no doubt that the number of techniques of 
manipulating those markets will also increase. In Australia, the way securities are 
traded has evolved from manual processes to the use of predominately automated 
systems by stockbrokers. Further technological innovations have led to the rise of 
High Frequency Trading (HFT) which usually involves very fast trading by 
computers executing strategies derived from complex algorithms. Market structure 
changes have also fundamentally altered the way people trade securities. The 
introduction of competition to the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) by the licensing 
of a new rival exchange, Chi-X, has enabled meaningful multi-market trading in 
Australia for the first time. Finally equity market liquidity is fragmenting with large 
amounts of trading now occurring off ‘lit’ exchanges in the crossing systems of large 
investment banks, known as ‘dark pools’.  
Markets Regulators around the world are struggling to adapt legal frameworks 
to the new world of complex trading. Recently the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organisation of Canada (IIROC) (2012) released proposed guidance on prohibiting 
particular forms of manipulation namely ‘layering’, ‘quote manipulation’, ‘spoofing’ 
and ‘abusive liquidity detection’ that arguably are enhanced in a computerised high-
speed and multi-market trading environment. The U.S. Court of Appeals rightly noted 
in Cargill Inc v Hardin that the ‘techniques of manipulation are limited only by the 
ingenuity of man’ (452 F.2.d 1154, 1163). 
There is a danger that law-makers and regulators will confuse market 
manipulation with the latest changes in market technology and structure. The ASX 
has noted that it is ‘often problematic to distinguish between what is manipulative and 
trading activity that is evidence of the competition for the smartest, fastest and most 
profitable algorithm’ (2011, p.39). Nevertheless, it is vital that law-makers ensure law 
reform is sophisticated enough to only target actual manipulation without impeding 
the natural evolution of the market. Fast computerised trading, in itself, is not market 
manipulation. In fact, HFT appears to provide vital liquidity to equity markets and has 
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been shown to be negatively correlated to end-of-day price dislocations, a proxy for 
manipulation (Frino & Lepone, 2012). This suggests that more automated exchanges 
may actually be less susceptible to market manipulation. More automated exchanges 
may face other challenges however such as the technical glitch which lead to the 6 
May 2010 flash crash where the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged down 9% 
only to recover those losses within minutes. After conducting detailed studies into 
HFT and Dark Pools (2013) and consulting with industry, ASIC has adopted a 
cautious and nuanced approach that attempts to target manipulation without unduly 
impeding the ability of Australian equity markets to develop in sophistication. The 
ASX Chief Executive, Elmer Funke Kupper has backed ASIC’s approach stating that 
the regulator’s decisions on market structure ‘have left us in a better position than 
many other western markets’ (Liondis 2013). 
The consensus view is that carefully targeted laws are required to effectively 
prosecute and deter harmful market manipulation. By distorting a market’s price 
formation and discovery process and victimising legitimate investors, market 
manipulation is generally understood as having a severely negative impact on market 
efficiency and integrity. The potential harm of manipulation is particularly concerning 
in an Australian context given the enormous potential for ‘Mum and Dad’ investors, 
invested to the sum of $1.58 trillion in markets via superannuation, to be ripped-off. 
Markets with higher incidences of manipulation would appear more likely to have 
higher costs of capital, a vital measure that companies use in evaluating whether to 
engage in their business (Modigliani and Miller 1958). In this way, manipulation 
undermines the very purpose of financial markets, being the cost-effective transfer of 
investment from those in financial surplus to those in financial deficit. 
Despite this consensus view there is a severe absence of empirical research 
that demonstrates how market manipulation actually harms markets. According to 
Goldwasser (1999), this has led to the unsatisfactory position of not knowing how 
often real-world prices are manipulated, how much harm manipulation does or how 
manipulation laws influence behaviours (1999, p.188). She asserts that laws 
prohibiting manipulation are said to operate in a ‘conceptual vacuum’ with little 
discussion of the underlying policy consideration or analysis of the effectiveness of 
the overall scheme of regulation (1999, p.149).  
This study’s empirical study of actual cases of market manipulation on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange attempts to fill a portion of this conceptual vacuum. 
Doing so, it refutes Fischel and Ross’s (1991) view that trade-based manipulation is 
unprofitable and self-deterring. The demonstrated harm of manipulation to market 
efficiency and integrity provides policy-makers in all jurisdictions an evidence-based 
rationale and some justification for evaluating legal responses designed to prosecute 
and deter this harmful crime.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction and Information Asymmetry  
 Despite the absence of empirical work, there is a flourishing of theoretical 
work that examines market manipulation drawing on market microstructure theory. 
Ever since the insightful commentary of Bagehot (1971) market microstructure 
analysis has developed into a useful tool to understand market exchange, particularly 
when some parties know more than others. 
 Since the seminal work of Fama (1970), share markets have constantly been 
held up to the standard of a perfectly competitive and efficient market in which price-
taking investors buy and sell shares so that prices fully reflect all available 
information about a company’s prospects. Ideally the price at which exchange takes 
place is efficient, reflecting all public and private information about a company’s 
prospects. In reality, stock markets fall short of this ideal. The separation of 
ownership and management necessitates a minimum information asymmetry in stock 
markets. Privileged parties may possess better or non-public information and the rest 
of the market knows it.  Manipulators may be capable of fooling rational information-
seeking investors into trading at artificial prices by capitalising on market perceptions 
that some people know more than others.  
2.1 Market Microstructure Theory  
 The key measure in market microstructure theory is the bid-ask spread. The 
spread is the difference in price and quantity preferences of buyers and sellers. When 
traders’ preferences overlap, a trade occurs. One significant component of the spread 
is an adverse selection risk associated with market information asymmetry (See 
Copeland & Galai 1983; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; and Kyle 1985). Where a market 
participant trades with an ‘informed’ trader who possesses special information that 
they do not possess, they always make a loss (Bagehot 1971, p.14) 
 Benston and Hagerman (1974) hypothesised that this component related to a 
share’s unsystematic risk, being the risk that results from the market adjustment to the 
company firm specific information like earnings announcements, executive 
appointments etc. Markowitz (1959) originally found that this unsystematic risk could 
be eliminated as the number of securities approached infinity. 
 Where a market participant suspects the existence of informed traders they 
increase the spread (cost) of transactions to discourage such trading and compensate 
themselves by making more money out of price-taking liquidity traders. By increasing 
the cost of trading, information asymmetry decreases a market’s liquidity (Kyle 1985, 
p.1317).  
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Krinsky and Lee (1996) demonstrated the impact of information asymmetry by 
finding that spreads widen before the public release of information and narrow 
afterwards. While increasing the spread is a rational response to the prospect of 
informed trading, higher spreads negatively impacts the efficiency of the market.  
 Spreads have also been observed to widen for large trades. Trades themselves 
may convey ‘informed’ information. Easely and O’Hara (1987) explain that trade size 
contains an informational risk as only ‘informed’ traders seek to trade in as large 
amounts as possible to take full advantage of their information before it becomes 
public (1987, p.70).  This fact may explain why large transactions tend to be traded at 
worse prices (Kraus & Stroll, 1972). Thus both the bid-ask spread and the size of 
transactions may be used as a proxy for the level of market information asymmetry. 
2.2. Strategic Manipulative Trading  
 Many foundational models postulate that successful market manipulation 
involves the manipulator giving out false signals to fool information-seeking investors 
into thinking he or she is a truthful ‘informed’ trader (Kyle 1985; Allen & Gale 1992; 
Kumar & Seppi 1992; Fishman & Hagerty 1992). Active information-seeking 
investors normally keep markets efficient by identifying ‘informed’ traders and 
trading alongside them, reducing the profits of non-public information and increasing 
the information in stock prices (Thel 1994, p.231). By conveying false ‘private’ 
information (false positives), manipulations are able to capture profits by trading 
against these information-seeking investors (Kim & Jungsoo 2010, p.298). 
 Some trading practices may be so indicative of an informed trader that the 
manipulator will be able to achieve the desired result by mimicking them. For 
example, a manipulator might increase a security’s price by aggressively purchasing 
before an earnings announcement to suggest that people with valuable non-public 
information are buying (Thel 1994, p.241). Duped information-seekers will copy, 
pushing up the price of the stock. The manipulator sells at the high level before the 
public announcement and the inevitable price adjustment back down to equilibrium 
prices.  
 Allen and Gale (1992) have modelled the possibility of successful 
manipulation where the manipulator pools (or trades alongside with) an informed 
trader. The informed trader anticipates, perhaps because of inside information, that 
favourable information about the stock will be revealed in the future. Consequently 
the informed trader begins buying the undervalued stock. Information asymmetry is 
introduced into the model, as information-seekers are unable to tell if the trader is 
actually informed or not. By simply imitating the trading of the informed trader, the 
manipulation can profit simply by buying and selling the stock. It is this pooling that 
‘allows manipulation to be profitable’ (1992, p.517). ‘As investors are uncertain if the 
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informed trader is actually informed, they are prepared to trade with him for lower 
than the informed trader’s expected value. As time passes, the information is priced 
into the stock as it rises and the informed trader exists his position’ (1992, p.509).  
 Allen and Gale rely on the assumption that there is an informed trader for the 
manipulator to imitate in order for manipulation to be profitable. The model relies on 
information asymmetry. To be successful, manipulators must convince the market 
they are informed traders, not manipulators, as no trader would trade with a 
manipulator where they are guaranteed to lose money (Thel 1994, p.245). For a 
manipulator to know the identity of informed traders or to credibly pose as an 
informed trader, a manipulator’s own identity is important.  
 Many studies have suggested that certain parties have an incentive to 
manipulate given their market-wide status as likely informed parties. Scholes first 
noted that corporate insiders have monopolistic access to information about their 
firms (Scholes 1969). When paid in stock options, corporate insiders have a clear 
incentive to strategically influence the value of their derivative position (Vanden 
2005). Further, Niederhoffer and Osbourne (1966) originally pointed out that 
exchange specialists, brokers and market makers also have monopolistic information 
and may be seen as reliable and informed parties. Hillion and Suominen (2004) 
identify an agency-based model of closing price manipulation suggesting these 
brokers themselves may manipulate the closing price of a stock in order to give a 
better impression of their executions to their customers. More obviously, a ‘large 
investment bank, prior to executing a merger or acquisition transaction may 
manipulate prices of the stock of the company in question’ (Hillion & Suominen 
2004, p.370). An investment bank may manipulate to ensure their corporate advice is 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 The microstructure theory that informed parties have an incentive to 
manipulate has empirical support. In the first empirical examination of market 
manipulation, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) used an event study to examine 142 
prosecuted cases of stock market manipulation on U.S. stock markets. They found 
that manipulators were mostly ‘informed’ parties such as corporate insiders, 
underwriters, large shareholders and market makers who successfully manipulated 
prices to higher ‘artificial’ levels (2006, p.1948). In Aggarwal and Wu’s empirical 
study of manipulation 47% of cases involved corporate insiders such as executives 
and directors; 64% involved stockbrokers; 9% involved market makers and 32% 
involved large shareholders with at least 5% of company equity ownership (2006, 
p.1937).  
 Aggarwal and Wu found most of the manipulation in dataset occurred in 
relatively inefficient markets. These markets are characterised by small size and low 
liquidity, often not having appropriate regulatory oversight or disclosure 
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requirements. They found that manipulators normally targeted shares with very low 
average trading volumes and market capitalisation, so called ‘penny stocks’ (2006, 
p.1936). By comparison, the largest stock exchange in the world – the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was relatively free of manipulation constituting only 2.11% 
of their sample manipulation (2006, p.1936). This empirical supports the view that 
manipulation is more likely for stocks with low liquidity/volumes as these markets 
have an inelastic supply curve. The purchases of a manipulator then may have a larger 
price impact than would otherwise occur in a more liquid market. Thus manipulation 
of prices is easier with thinly-traded stocks (Thel 1994, p.231).  
 Importantly, Aggarwal and Wu found that manipulators were successfully 
able to create artificial prices and sell at these high levels before prices returned to 
their true value (2006, p.1948). The victims of manipulators were information seeking 
investors (such as arbitrageurs), potentially fooled by false positives. In the presence 
of manipulation, increasing the number of information-seeking investors does not 
enhance market efficiency but merely increases the profits of manipulators. In these 
situations ‘the need for government regulation is acute.’ (2006, p.1916). Aggarwal 
and Wu conclude that their results suggest ‘a strong role for government regulation to 
discourage manipulation while encouraging greater competition for information’ 
(2006, p.1947).  Aggarwal and Wu (2006) event study model is used in Part 3’s 
empirical study of manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
2.3 Categorisation of Manipulative Techniques  
Market manipulation techniques can range from crude devices to highly sophisticated 
schemes. The literature broadly defines manipulative techniques into 3 categories, 
namely trade-based, action-based and information-based manipulation (Allen & Gale 
1992, p.505). While these distinctions often overlap, they are nonetheless useful to 
demonstrate the variety of methods of manipulation.  
2.3.1 Trade-Based Manipulation  
Trade-based manipulation is due solely to buying or selling of securities without the 
manipulator taking actions to alter the value of the firm or using false information. 
Jarrow (1992) suggested that large uninformed traders with market power could 
manipulate prices to their advantage and generate profits at no risk (1992, p.332). 
Profitable manipulators aimed to create ‘price momentum’ so that an increase in price 
caused by the manipulator’s trade at one date tended to increase prices at future dates. 
Jarrow also showed that profitable manipulation is possible where the manipulator 
corners the market (1992, p.313). Contrastingly, Allen and Gale (1992) found that 
manipulation is possible even when there is no price momentum and no possibility of 
a corner by the aforementioned pooling with an informed party (1992, p.506).  
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 By challenging typical market microstructure assumptions, Allen and Gorton 
(1992) demonstrated that profitable trade-based manipulation is possible in markets 
that display information asymmetry. The common microstructure assumption is that 
‘liquidity’ traders have exogenous preference to trade immediately and must therefore 
pay the spread. Allen and Gorton note that this assumption does not accord with 
reality. While traders have all sorts of needs for cash immediately, it is difficult to 
understand why a trader is so desperate to buy shares that they disregard the price. 
Clearly liquidity sales are more likely than liquidity purchases (1992, p.625). As 
liquidity sales are more likely than purchases, there is less information in a sale than a 
purchase because the trader is less likely to be informed (1992, p.625). This natural 
asymmetry leads to asymmetrical price responses as the bid price will move less in 
response to a sale than does the ask price in response to a purchase. Allen and Gorton 
suggest that a manipulator can engage in profitable manipulation by repeatedly 
buying stock, causing a relatively large effect on prices and then sell with relatively 
small effect (1992, 625). Allen & Gorton (1992) appear to refute Fischel and Ross’s 
suggestion that trade-based manipulation cannot profit because price effects as 
symmetrical (1991, p.519). 
 Kumar and Seppi (1992) also demonstrated the possibility of profitable trade-
based manipulation by a manipulator pooling with an informed trader. In their model, 
a manipulator buys a number of stock market index futures. The manipulator then 
trades alongside an informed trader, bidding up the shares underlying the index 
thereby raising the settlement price he obtains on expiry of the futures contract. If the 
futures position is larger than the spot position, the net expected gain is positive 
(1992, p.1486). This manipulative technique is colloquially known as ‘punching the 
settlement price’.  
 The feasibility of Kumar and Seppi’s model of cross-market manipulation 
applying is limited but certainly not impossible. The manipulator would incur 
substantial transaction costs by trading the whole basket of shares underlying the 
index (1992, p.1497). Risk aversion in taking so large a position may stop the 
manipulator. The manipulator would also need an exceptionally large position in the 
market to move the index otherwise his return at delivery of the futures would be 
inadequate to cover his spot market trading. Risk aversion in taking so large a position 
may stop the manipulation. Despite these limitations, the most audacious case of 
market manipulation in Australia to date involved exactly the type of manipulation 
Kumar & Seppi (1992) described. 
 That case was Australian Securities Commission v Nomura  (1998) 160 ALR 
246. Nomura had a large arbitrage position in index futures on the Sydney Futures 
Exchange, known as SPI contracts in securities traded on the ASX. Nomura held 
10,912 contracts due to expire on the 29th of March 1996. It held a ‘matching’ basket 
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of shares reflecting the index, as part of its arbitrage position worth 
$AUD600,000,000. The expiry price of the SPI contracts was determined by the 
closing price of the level of the All Ordinaries on that day. Nomura attempted to 
manipulate the expiry price of the futures to captures profits from its arbitrage 
position. First it gave instructions to brokers to aggressively sell near the close of 
trading on the 29th without concern for price. Secondly, Nomura instructed brokers to 
buy the same shares just sold at prices substantially below the last traded price. For 
most illiquid securities, the bid price was 5%-20% less than the last recorded sale. 
Had all brokers carried out their instructions correctly, Nomura would have moved 
the closing price of the All Ords down and made significant speculative profits in its 
SPI contracts. In the case of two illiquid stocks, the brokers ‘hit’ the bid basket and 
Nomura effectively bought its own shares at depressed prices. The court did not 
accept Nomura’s argument that it was legitimately unwinding an arbitrage position (at 
249). His Honour Sackville J found that in seeking profits, Nomura intended to create 
a false and misleading appearance of active trading on the ASX (at 250). Just because 
it had an economically legitimate goal (arbitrage) ‘did not necessary mean that all 
strategies associated with that objective were lawful’ (at 345).  
2.3.2 Action-Based Manipulation 
Unlike trade-based manipulation, action-based manipulation involves a manipulator 
influencing the beliefs of other traders to change the perceived value of the firm. 
Strategic trading by manipulators to capitalise on market perceptions of them as 
‘informed’ fall within this type of manipulation (Vila 1989).  
 Several studies have claimed that action-based manipulation is possible when 
the informed manipulator first trades in the wrong direction of their information 
(Kose & Narayanan 1997) (Huddart, Hughes & Levine 2001) (Chakraborty & Yilmaz 
2004). This ‘noise’ trading is done to confuse investors into believing the informed 
trader is not trading on his private information. This results in reduced 
informativeness of his or her subsequent disclosures because the ‘market is no longer 
sure whether an insider buys (sells) indicates good (bad) news’ (Kose & Narayanan 
1997, p.217). This noise trading acts as camouflage for their real manipulative 
transactions in the right direction of their information. For example, an insider who 
knows that the prospects of a certain company are not good might actually start 
buying in order to drive its price up and then sell without its price falling too fast. In 
the Chakraborty and Yilmaz’s model, this ‘noise’ allows the informed manipulator to 
profit in every equilibrium (2004, p.133).  
 Gerald and Nanda (1993) demonstrated the possibility of action-based 
manipulation around seasoned equity offerings. An ‘informed’ manipulator, 
possessing private information about an upcoming stock issue, can influence the issue 
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price by short selling shares before the issue. Seizing on the informativeness of his 
trades, information-seeking investors will copy him, pushing overall market prices 
down. The manipulator’s selling actually conceals his knowledge about the upcoming 
float and sends a false signal to the market. Manipulative trading decreases the 
informativeness of the secondary market order flow, thereby exacerbating the 
winner’s curse problem faced by uninformed bidders and leading to an increase in the 
seasoned offering discount required to float the offering (1993, p.214).  
 To ensure the success of the float, the issuing company is forced to issue the 
new shares at a discount from (manipulated) secondary market prices. In subscribing 
to the new issue, the manipulator recoups his losses by purchasing shares at 
significant discounts in the offering. Gerald and Nanda have found that the magnitude 
of the discount required to successfully float the offering is directly related to the 
expected occurrence of manipulation. Manipulation will occur when the informed 
investor expects to secure significantly more shares in the offering than the number of 
shares he needs to trade in the pre-issue secondary market to conceal his information 
(1993, p.217). 
 The ability of a manipulator to profit from strategic trading depends on the 
price response asymmetries in the market. Manipulators need to be able to earn more 
from trading in the right direction than from trading in the wrong direction. Benabou 
and Laroque (1992) have shown that various informed parties (corporate officers, 
financial journalists and investment ‘gurus’) have the incentives to manipulate stock 
markets through strategically distorted pubic announcements or forecasts (1992, 
p.921). Their model begins with an insider who knows that that returns on a stock will 
rise. Instead of merely engaging in insider trading, this informed party could earn 
more by forecasting low returns to the public and then buying up the stock at 
depressed prices (1992, p.923).  
 Benabou and Laroque use game theory to develop a model where information-
seeking investors can constantly reassess this investment guru’s credibility over time. 
Rational speculators may even attach credibility to a dishonest informed party 
because she or he may still reveal some genuine information out of concern for her or 
his reputation. The ability of these insiders to manipulate over the long run is limited 
only by the public’s constant reassessment of their credibility (1992, p.922). Where 
the manipulator gives out false information, observation over many announcements 
will help the market learn whether the insider is an untruthful manipulator and her or 
his creditability will accordingly plummet (1992, p.922). 
 Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) considered the possibility of profitable action-
based manipulation in the context of takeover bids. In periods of high takeover 
activity, a manipulator may announce a fake takeover bid for a company. Since the 
information-seekers cannot tell if the bid is serious, they will rationally start 
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purchasing and drive market prices higher. At this point, the manipulator drops his 
takeover bid, which had been fake from the beginning, and sells at the higher market 
price (1996, p.126) For example in what was considered widely questionable 
behaviour, an aborted takeover bid for David Jones Ltd in June 2012 caused shares in 
David Jones to jump 15% higher before dropping more than 10% (Metherell 2012).  
 
2.5.3 Information-based Manipulation 
Information-Based Manipulation is manipulation based on releasing false or 
misleading information or rumours (Allen and Gale 1992, p.505).  
 Van Bommel (2003) investigated the manipulative strategy known as 
‘rumourtage’ – the spreading of false rumours to move prices to an artificial level and 
obtain trading profit (2003, p.1499). In the Van Bommel model, the informed 
manipulator spreads a binary (either bullish or bearish) rumour. This rumour causes a 
market overreaction whereby the price overshoots the fair value of the stock. Van 
Bommel finds that the rumourmonger has the opportunity to profit twice: first as she 
trades in the direction of her information and secondly when she trades in the opposite 
direction knowing the effect of the rumour to be overshooting (2003, p.1500). Van 
Bommel’s model demonstrated that this strategy imposes a moral hazard cost on 
rumourmongers: If followers understand that an informed trader has incentive to 
cheat, they will no longer take notice of rumours (2003, p.1513).  An analysis of 
repeated games shows that opportunistic manipulators will refrain from bluffing or 
cheating because they may lose their reputation and their ability to manipulate prices 
(2003, p.1513). 
The advent of the Internet has dramatically increased the opportunities to 
spread market rumours. Van Bommel noted that the internet has proven a very 
productive incubator of rumours in online chatrooms, newsgroups and message 
boards (2003, p1500). Of course rumours can still be spread the old fashioned way – 
word of mouth, newsletters and financial broadsheets. While increased dissemination 
of price-sensitive information is a positive development for market efficiency, this 
new media also present opportunities for manipulators. Manipulators can 
anonymously add their own strategically biased messages in online stockbroking 
forums.  
Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) undertook to empirically test the ability of 
manipulators to impact markets through online forums. They examined the 
relationship between internet message board activity and abnormal stock returns and 
trading volumes. Perhaps surprisingly, they found returns were statistically 
insignificant as compared with message board activity (2001, p.51). Their findings 
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contradict anecdotal evidence that stock manipulation via online message boards is 
rampant and widespread.  
 Despite Tumarkin and Whitelaw’s study, concerns about manipulative 
rumours have grown and recently peaked in the Global Financial Crisis. The 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (2009) has observed that ‘when 
markets fall rapidly or go through a stage of volatility and uncertainty, the potential 
for market manipulation increases’. The Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee noted that ‘in late 2008, the financial crisis gave rise to concerns in 
Australia and other markets that short sellers were using rumours to drive down the 
price of particular stocks’(2009, p.95). The concerns around rumourtage were one 
reason why ASIC imposed the ban of short-selling of financial stocks. ASIC also 
instigated ‘Project Mint’, an investigation into the impact of false rumours and 
manipulation. Despite the persistent and widespread anecdotal claims of information-
based market manipulation in the worst global market collapse since 1929, which 
purportedly justified the imposition of the longest short-selling ban in the developed 
world, Project Mint famously only procured one conviction before being shelved 
(Verrender 2009). This reflects more the prosecutorial and evidentiary challenges of 
successfully convicting manipulations and not the complete absence of substantive 
rumourtage in the market.   
3. Empirical Investigation of the HKSE 
This is the first study to examine the HKSE utilising a comprehensive sample of 
actual manipulation cases. By using an event study method, this study seeks to 
establish whether: (a) manipulators on the HKSE are able to alter prices and profit 
from these changes; and (b) examine the impact of manipulation on measures of 
market efficiency. The empirical implications of this study of the HKEX act as a 
warning to all organised exchanges about the potential harm of market manipulation. 
 The HKEX was chosen as a comparable stock exchange to the ASX in terms 
of market capitalisation, trading mechanisms and sophistication. The trading and legal 
institutional framework of the HKSE is broadly comparable to that the ASX, which 
suggests that the empirical implications of manipulation on the HKEX may be 
applicable to other order-driven exchanges, such as the ASX and Chi-X. Utilising 
these results, this study provides a rationale for why market manipulation must 
continue to be prohibited by law and robustly prosecuted to deter future misconduct.  
3.1 Institutional Framework  
The HKSE is Asia’s second largest stock exchange in terms of market capitalisation 
and the fifth largest in the world. According to the World Federation of Exchanges 
(2013), the HKSE, as at July 2013, had 1,531 listed companies and a total market 
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capitalisation of $HK 21,509.4 billion or $AUD 3,012.5 billion. For comparison, the 
ASX at July 2013 has a market capitalisation of $AUD1,421.4 billion and 2,184 listed 
companies (World Federation of Exchanges 2013). 
 The HKEX is an order-driven market. Stocks are predominantly traded during 
the continuous trading session that lasts from 9:30am to 4pm. During a continuous 
trading session, the Third Generation Automatic Order Matching and Execution 
System (‘AMS/3’) matches buy and sell orders submitted by exchange participants by 
the specified price and order size.  
 The legislation prohibiting share market manipulation in Hong Kong is the 
CAP 571 Securities and Futures Ordinance (Hong Kong) (‘SFO’).  The SFO 
introduced the concept of ‘market misconduct’ to the Hong Kong regulatory regime 
and replaced the more constrained categories of manipulation that existed in the 
superseded CAP 333 Securities Ordinance (Hong Kong) Pt XII. These old provisions 
have been described as ‘the most difficult part of the ordinance, due largely to the 
inherent weakness of statutory language to tackle a sophisticated and complex area of 
stock market activities’ (Au 1988).  
 Market Misconduct is defined in section 245 of the SFO as including insider 
dealing, false trading, price rigging, disclosure of false or misleading information and 
stock market manipulation. The notion of ‘market misconduct’ is roughly based on 
the equivalent provisions in Australian corporate law (Arjunan 2003).  
 Section 278(1) of the SFO defines stock market manipulation as involving two 
or more transactions that aim to increase, decrease or maintain market prices with an 
intention to induce others to trade. This formulation of manipulation incorporates 
several problematic issues. First it does not capture single transactions accompanied 
by a fraudulent/manipulative intent, however objectionable. Secondly, proving intent 
to induce creates conceptual programs in distinguishing manipulation from legitimate 
trades. Indeed, it could be suggested that the object of every bid or ask may be seen as 
intending to change the price to induce another to trade. The maximum penalty for an 
indictable breach of the anti-manipulation provision is, per s303 of the SOF, a fine of 
$HK 10,000,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years.  
 The responsible Hong Kong regulator is the Securities and Futures 
Commission (‘SFC’) which was modelled on the Australian Securities Commission, 
the precursor to ASIC. The SFC’s statutory objectives in section 4 of the SFO include 
maintaining and promoting the fairness, efficiency, competitiveness, transparency and 








3.2 Description of Data  
This event study examines a comprehensive set of market manipulation cases that 
were successfully prosecuted by the SFC. These 40 cases of manipulation occurred 
between April 1996 to March 2009. The dataset extends back before the enactment of 
CAP 333 Securities Ordinance (Hong Kong). 
 The unique sample of cases includes a considerable amount of market data 
obtained from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). This 
intraday data includes the time to the second of each trade, bid, ask, volume and price. 
In examining this data, this study adopts the market microstructure analyst method by 
using volumes and the bid-ask spread as proxies for information asymmetry to 
examine the strategy behaviour of market particulars as they react to manipulation.  
 There are several noteworthy caveats to this dataset. The data only includes 
cases of manipulation involving shares and does not extend to cases of manipulation 
of other financial products. This excludes from the some dataset some prominent 
cases of manipulation like the Court of Appeal decision of HKSAR v Fu Kor Kuen 
Patrick [2011] 1 HKLRD 655, CACC 179/2010 that involved manipulation of 
derivative warrants issued by Macquarie Bank Ltd. In that case, the traders traded 
derivative instruments between each other, back and forth to qualify for commission 
rebates provided by Macquarie. Recently on appeal in Fu Kor Kuen v. HKSAR 
(FACC No. 4 of 2011, May 24, 2012) the Final Court of Appeal overturned this 
conviction finding that the trading for rebates was not undertaken for the purpose of 
creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading or with respect to the 
market for securities.  
 Secondly the data only includes historical cases where the SFC brought a 
successful enforcement action. This omits potential cases where manipulation; (a) 
occurred but was undetected, or (b) was detected but the SFC did not bring a 
successful enforcement action. This investigation therefore shares the same weakness 
of the seminal work of Aggarwal and Wu (2006). The data, and therefore the results, 
may be said to only apply to ‘poor’ manipulators in the sense that they were caught.  
 The cases in the data set were all trade-based manipulation, predominantly 
involving thinly traded stocks. Almost all cases involved manipulation to force a 
stock price higher, often by placing bids and trading near the close at successively 
higher prices. Only one case within the dataset involved a manipulator attempting to 
stabilise a market price. This was the case of Han Sze Chao (SFC, 2007) where the 
SFC found Han caused small and/or single board lots to be placed to stabilise the 
price of shares in Fortuna International Holdings Ltd, effectively pegging the price of 
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those shares at $HK0.30 (SFC, July 2004). No case involved trying to push prices 
lower.  
 The price impact on the manipulated shares in the dataset was reported as an 
increase anywhere between 5% and 150%. In all except two cases, the plaintiff(s) 
pleaded guilty and received fines/suspended sentences. The first ‘not guilty’ case was  
Securities & Futures Commission v Choi Wai Zak [2003] 1 HKC 30 HCMA 
264/2002. The case involved two defendants charged with creating a false appearance 
of active trading the shares of the Hong Kong Parkview Group Ltd. This was the only 
case involving section 135 of the Securities Ordinance (Hong Kong) cap 333 that was 
appealed. Choy and Yuen were convicted of trading the shares in tranches with each 
trade at a higher price that the previous ones, giving the impression of a rising price. 
These trades involved no change in beneficial ownership. At [19] the Court imposed a 
sentence of 8 months and 4 months respectively. 
 The second case where the defendants pleaded ‘not guilty’ case was HKSAR v 
Chan Chin-yuen and others (2008) DCC683/2008. This is the most criminally serious 
case in the dataset and is the largest case of market manipulation in the history of the 
HKSE. The four defendants conspired to create a false appearance market for the 
shares of the Asia Standard Hotel Group Ltd (‘ASH’). They traded ASH shares 
among themselves with their trades constituting 60.2% of all ASH shares bought in 
the relevant period. The effect of their false trading ramped up the company’s market 
capitalisation by HK$4 billion. The pattern of trading led to the irresistible inference 
that it was not genuine trading but trading designed to manipulate the shares in ASH 
by creating a false impression of demand. If such activities were undeterred, the court 
found they would have undermined the fairness of the HKEX. Accordingly, the court 
at [41] imposed sentences of imprisonment ranging between 26 months to 30 months. 
 As previously stated, an indictable conviction of market misconduct enables a 
prison sentence of up to 10 years to be imposed per s.303 of the SFO. Mitigating 
factors aside, this was the most serious case of market manipulation criminality in 
Hong Kong’s history and the imprisonment sentences in no way reflected anywhere 
near the maximum as provided by the SFO. One possible reason for this is that courts 
simply do not consider market manipulation to have an objective level of serious 
criminality in order to justify the imposition of more harsh penalties.   
3.3 Preparation of Data  
To empirically test how the market responds to manipulation, this study uses a robust 
econometric tool called an ‘event study’. Event studies were originally used to test the 
association between company earnings and market prices (Ball & Brown 1968). Since 
then, event studies have been widely used by U.S. courts to examine the impact of 
market manipulation (Leas 1974; Scwert 1981). Fischel stated that the use of event 
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studies enables a determination of whether false information caused a security to trade 
at an ‘artificially high or low level’ (1982, p.17). Macey, Miller, Mitchell and Netter 
noted that when an ‘event study methodology shows a fraudulent event has a 
statistically significant effect on the price of a firm’s securities, courts are justify in 
presuming reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory’ (1991, p.1018).  
 The dataset of intraday trading activity was first summarised into daily 
measures. The ‘event’ date was designated as the date of the manipulation. In order to 
examine the ability of manipulation to move market prices, returns are used.  
 
 Return: the percentage capital gain of holding a share price over two 
consecutive days. The measure reflects share price movements. 
 
	 	 	 	
	 	
      (3.1) 
To examine the impact of manipulation and other variables, this study uses a number 
of explanatory variables:  
 
 The bid-ask spread is the difference between the close of trade asking price 
and the close of trade bid price. The bid-ask spread has been identified as an 
important measure of information asymmetry, liquidity and efficiency. 
 
 Quoted BAS = Ask Price – Bid Price     (3.2) 
 
 Volume: the total amount of shares traded on a particular day. 
 
 Proportional Bid-Ask Spread: The proportional bid-ask spread is used as a 
control for variations in stock prices across stocks and over time.  
 
      (3.3) 
 
 Volatility or Risk: is calculated by taking the logarithm of the proportion of 
the high and the low price on each day for each stock.  
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 Dichotomous Variable: the dichotomous variable takes on the value of 0 
before the event date and 1 after the event date. 
 
             (3.5) 
 
In order to examine the effects of manipulation on the market, a time period around 
the event must be identified. This study uses a time period of 200 days. This means 
that the cases have been examined over the prior 100 days before the manipulation 
and 100 days after. In order to allow for comparison of manipulation across the cases, 
cross-sectional averages were calculated for each relative day. These averages of the 
explanatory variables are used as measure of the buying and selling interests of the 
market. To avoid ‘infection’ by unrelated or confounding events, data from days of a 
company announcement have been removed.  
 
 T=-100, 100 
 
The descriptive statistics used in univariate analysis may be used to compare the state 
of the market before manipulation to the market after manipulation. By examining 
each variable individually, this analysis can demonstrate manipulation’s direct impact 
on the market. To test the significance of the variables to a control period, a t-test is 
used. A test-statistic highlights how far away the variables results, , are from the 
hypothesised control value, , scaled by the standard deviations of the mean, . 
Where the t-statistic is a large, the observed value has been greatly impacted by 
manipulation. Large t-statistics over 2 as a rule-of-thumb are said to be statistically 
significant. 
 








if  observation falls before event date,
















Table 3-1: Cross-Sectional Average Sample. 
Time series are calculated for each variable being bid-ask spread, proportional bid-ask spread, returns, 
risk and volume for 100 days before and after the manipulation date.  
 
By blending univariate testing with regression analysis this study will employ a robust 
method of examining the market reaction to manipulation. To test the descriptive 
results, this investigation will run the following regressions.  
 
Regression Set 1: 
BAS = α + β1Dt + εt        (3.7) 
PBAS = α + β1 Dt + εt        (3.8) 
BAS = α + β1Dt + β2Volumet + β3Volatilityt + εt    (3.9) 
PBAS = α + β1Dt + β2Volumet + β3Volatilityt + εt    (3.10) 
 
These regression equations will be used to test how statistically significant each 
explanatory variable is to the BAS and PBAS. β represents each independent 
variable’s coefficient. α is the significance level and εt a measure of error.  
 Equations 3.7 and 3.8 regress the BAS and PBAS onto the dummy variable. 
Using the dichotomous variable as the only explanatory variable demonstrates the 
extent to which manipulation affects the spread. It is important to note why both the 
bid-ask spread and the proportional bid-ask spread are used. Unlike the bid-ask 
spread, the proportional bid-ask spread reflects the relative spread. The PBAS has a 
higher explanatory power because it potentially provides more accurate results 
Relative 
Date 
BAS PBAS Returns Risk Volume 
-100 0.013502 0.078020 -0.008590 0.023745 1145411 
-99 0.026580 0.096396 -0.011429 0.027896 1895708 
-98 0.015782 0.099850 -0.012313 0.020184 1183024 
            
-2 0.014951 0.108525 0.000213 0.100705 1081180 
-1 0.029201 0.173075 -0.020344 0.073705 1208936 
0 0.054199 0.212850 0.008276 0.100475 569000 
1 0.053050 0.153306 -0.018381 0.047112 607018 
2 0.048017 0.120441 0.009574 0.066439 549833 
            
97 0.024959 0.189253 0.006363 0.043517 3395597 
98 0.021105 0.128917 0.014883 0.086382 1462211 
99 0.019354 0.117870 0.000973 0.030397 1790333 
100 0.035354 0.108292 -0.000492 0.041253 2042333 
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reflecting the relative difference in bids and asks, not just the raw spread. A simple 
example is instructive to demonstrate the difference between the BAS and PBAS is 
useful. For a bid/ask of $1000/$998 and $4/$2 the BAS is simply 2. Yet the relative 
spread or PBAS is .002 for the first example and .67 for the second.  
 Equations 3.9 and 3.10 introduce other variables to determine the degree to 
which the volume and volatility relates to the spread. While this may yield insightful 
results, the inclusion of these independent variables also increases the risk that the 
regression will identify random ‘noises’ that are unrelated to the manipulation.  
 The spread is not the only measure of information asymmetry. Recall that 
Easley and O’Hara (1987, p.70) have suggested that market liquidity has both a price 
dimension (spread) and a quantity dimension (volume). Hence the second regression 
set will use market volume as the dependant variable with the dummy, spread and 
volatility as explanatory variables.  
 
Regression Set 2:  
Volume = α + β1Dt + εt       (3.11)  
Volume = α + β1Dt + β2BAS + β3Volatility + εt    (3.12)  
Volume = α + β1Dt + β2PBAS + β3Volatility + εt    (3.13)  
  
Both sets of regressions’ statistical significance will be examined by reference to p-
values. The p-value is the probability of obtaining a t-statistic at least as extreme as 
the one actually observed when assuming manipulation has no effect on the market, 
being the null-hypothesis. If the p-value is less than the significance level (10%, 5% 
or 1%) the variable is said to be statistically significant to the independent variable. 
The smaller the p-value, the more strongly the test rejects the null hypothesis. For 
example, a p-value of .05 or less rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level. Lastly, it 
is noteworthy that returns are not being used in the regressions as an explanatory 
variable. This is because risk and return are highly correlated variables. Inclusion of 
returns would mean the results would display multicollinearity.  
3.4 Univariate Results  
The univariate results indicate that manipulators have a discernible impact on market 
prices, the spread, volume and overall market risk. Firstly, average market variables 
are compared with those present at the manipulation date. Market measures on the 









Table 3-2: Mean Statistics for a 200 day event period 
This table reports the descriptive averages for the 40 manipulated stocks. It also provides in bold, the 






Return Risk Volume 
Pre-event mean 0.0228 0.1137 -0.0008 0.0443 1341298 
Post-event mean 0.0243 0.1337 -0.0006 0.0489 1355646 
Total mean 0.0236 0.1237 -0.0007 0.0466 1348508 
Event  0.0542 0.2129 0.0083 0.1005 569000 
 
 Table 3-2 demonstrates higher BAS, PBAS, return and risk associated wit the 
date of actual manipulation. The large widening of the spreads indicates information 
leakage as market participants start requiring increased compensation for fear of 
trading with a suspected manipulator. The results strongly suggest that the presence of 
a manipulator harms market efficiency by increasing the cost of trading.  
 The event period was a time of negative growth with the pre, post and total 
returns being negative. Yet on the day of manipulation, returns and therefore prices 
increased. Event day returns are 141% higher than the previous day, up 114% on the 
pre-event mean and 129% above the total average. This appears to indicate that 
despite negative market sentiment, the manipulators have been able to raise prices to 
‘artificial’ levels.  
 Lastly it is observed that the trading volume on the date of manipulation is 
significantly lower than the averages. This intuitively suggests that manipulation is 
more successful in low volume markets as the distortive effect of manipulative trades 
on prices is likely to be amplified. This finding is consistent with Thel (1994) and also 
Aggarwal and Wu’s study (2006) regarding the increased likelihood of successful 
manipulation associated with low liquidity/volume stocks.  
 
3.4.1. Market Measures before and after manipulation  
A comparison between pre-event and post-event descriptive statistics is useful to 
understand the total impact of manipulation. Manipulation does not only affect the 
market on the ‘event’ date but throughout the following 100 days as the market 
adjusts to the presence of a manipulator. Table 3-3 outlines the descriptive statistics 
for the pre-event and post-event periods. Manipulation’s lasting impact is seen in 
increased averages for all market measures. 
 The mean bid-ask spread has widened by 65% in the post-event period. The 
median, maximum and minimum have also increased. Figure 1 shows two significant 
spikes in the average bid-ask spread around the manipulation date. The widening of 
the BAS reflect the rational response of market participants concern about trading 
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with a manipulator. Interestingly the existence of two spikes may suggest 
manipulators are playing the market with mis-information. The subsequent narrowing 
and then re-widening of the BAS may suggest manipulators are fooling participants 
into reacting too early and profiting from subsequent corrections. The average post-
event PBAS is up by 18%. The median, max, min and standard deviation have all also 
increased. Figure 2 shows the PBAS spikes at time 0. Further average market risk in 
the post-manipulation period has risen by 10%. The kurtosis also increased 
dramatically from 1.4 to 3.3.  
 Lastly the volume figures all show increased measures in the post-event 
period. The increased kurtosis (up from 5.33 to 13.26) reflects upward trends in 
volume traded in the post-event period. Figure 3 highlights that the manipulation 
(time 0) occurred at a time of exceptional low volume. 
 
 
Figure 1: Bid-Ask Spread Graph 
This figure depicts the average bid-ask spread for the 40 stocks that were manipulated on the HKEX 
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Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics for a 200 day event period 
This table reports the descriptive statistics (bid-ask spread, proportional bid-ask spread, risk, volatility (risk) and volume,) for the 40 manipulated stocks. For each variable, 





Return Volatility   Volume 
 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Mean 0.0228 0.0243 0.1137 0.1337 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0443 0.0489 1341298 1355646 
Median 0.0218 0.0221 0.0591 0.1294 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0378 0.0450 1094633 1146066 
Maximum 0.0612 0.0619 0.1957 0.2129 0.0545 0.0388 0.1158 0.1455 5960857 7681257 
Minimum 0.0094 0.0095 0.0094 0.0619 -0.0428 -0.0363 0.0162 0.0104 128778 265628 
St Dev 0.0099 0.0101 0.0500 0.0296 0.0162 0.0138 0.0211 0.0216 965515 1059783 
Skewness 1.5492 1.3694 0.4159 0.4145 0.3672 0.4454 1.2110 1.3835 1.8934 2.9605 
Kurtosis 2.7195 2.0557 -1.2223 0.0346 1.6167 1.0987 1.4702 3.3101 5.3349 13.2698 
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Figure 2: Proportional Bid-Ask Spread Graph  
This figure depicts the average proportional bid-ask spread for the 40 stocks that were manipulated on 

















Figure 3: Market Volume Graph  
This figure depicts the volume traded for the 40 stocks that were manipulated on the HKEX from 1996 
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3.4.2 Examination of Profitability of Manipulation 
To investigate whether markets display asymmetric price responses, further analysis 
of returns is required. The whole plethora of intraday buying and selling transactions 
must be examined to determine the relative returns. Relative returns per transaction 
for the pre and post-event period will highlight whether manipulators were able to 
move market prices to create an illegitimate profit.  
 Recall that Fischel and Ross (1991, p.518) have claimed that trade-based 
market manipulation is completely self-deterring as manipulators are unable to sell at 
the artificially high prices they have created. These authors (1991, p.519) suggest that 
any attempt to sell shares at an artificially high level, particularly in large quantities, 
will be unsuccessful as buying and selling have symmetric price impacts. The 
profitability of manipulation is also relates to how large a quantity may be transacted 
at artificially high prices. Easley & O’Hara have posited that trade size introduces an 
adverse selection risk (1987, p.70). While Easley & O’Hara (1987) were discussing 
insider trading, the same quantity bias may be true for manipulators. When 
manipulators have pushed share prices to artificial values, they would seek to trade in 
as large a quantity as possible before market prices return to fall back down to 
equilibrium. This theory suggests that market participants would raise spreads for 
large trades given the rational fear of trading with a manipulator.  
 Table 3-4 investigates the potential profitability of trade-based manipulation. 
The 40 case dataset was divided into quartiles with quartile 1 representing the 
smallest 25% of trades and quartile 4 representing the largest 25% of trades. The 
relative returns to both selling and buying transactions were calculated, as were t-
statistics. Table 3-4 show that returns increased dramatically in the post-event period 
for all four quartiles. This translates to a price impact as higher returns imply higher 
prices and lower negative returns imply lower prices. Increases in returns were higher 
than increases in sales. The higher purchase side returns provide empirical support to 
the asymmetric price responses suggested by Allen & Gorton (1992). Trade-based 
manipulation may be possible and profitable merely by buying with a relatively large 
effect and selling with a lesser effect with 75% of all trade sizes. This means a 
manipulator can buy with large effect on prices and sell with a smaller effect. The 
existence of profitable manipulation suggests some information asymmetry on the 
HKSE. Figure 4 has shown that spreads increased around time 0. This suggests that 
market participants were aware of the possibility of manipulation. Yet the increase in 
the cost of trading was not commensurate to stop profitable price manipulation. 
Returns were statistically significant for all quartiles, even the largest 25% of trades. 
Manipulators were likely able to sell at the high levels they engineered, for profit. Had 
ordinary investors been truly certain about the presence of manipulators, the spread 
would have risen to a level that would have made manipulation unprofitable.  
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Table 3-4: Buying and Selling Returns by Trade Size 
This table reports the returns data for both the buying and selling transactions. The returns are sorted into quartiles with the 1st quartile representing the smallest 25% of trades 
by volume and quartile 4 representing the largest 25% of trades. The negative figures for returns on the sell side reflect positive real returns for the sellers. The return 
percentage is negative only because the shares were sold and not bought. Thus the negative figure represents the loss to the buyer who trades with the seller. All quartile 
results are statistically significant, producing high t-statistics.  *connotes statistical significance. 
 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 All 
 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Panel A - Pre-period 
         
 
17.39% -6.10% 14.77% -7.10% 17.82% -8.40% 23.69% -13.60% 17.77% -8.20% 
Panel B - Post-period 
         
 
25.05% -17.40% 26.33% -14.70% 28.24% -16.10% 33.85% -22.30% 27.94% -17.60% 
% change 
          
 
7.66% -11.30% 11.56% -7.60% 10.42% -7.70% 10.16% -8.70% 10.17% -9.40% 
t-statistic 
          
 
13.4* -12.6* 11.2* -16.2* 14.1* -16.3* 12.4* -17.8* 12.9* -11.2* 
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3.5 Regression Results  
3.5.1 First Regression 
The first regression set produces highly significant results. The results examine the 
statistical relationship between the dummy variable (denoted as ‘change’ in table 3-
5), volume and risk on the spreads.  
 Equation 3.7 regresses the BAS onto the dummy variable, which represents 
the dataset change post manipulation. Regressing just the dummy variable is useful as 
it isolates the effect of manipulation on the BAS. The positive coefficient of .0015 
suggests manipulation does increase the BAS. The result is not highly significant 
however having a p-value above the 10% significance level. A dramatically more 
statistically significant result is found by regressing the PBAS onto the dummy. With 
a p-value of less than the 1% significance level, this suggests with 99% confidence 
that a higher PBAS is associated with manipulation. By isolating the effect of market 
manipulation on the PBAS, this regression represents a powerful finding.  
 Equation 3.9 also shows significant results. The positive coefficients for the 
volume and volatility variables suggest that the BAS increases when these variables 
increase. The volume coefficient is a negative figure that is unobservable to 4 decimal 
places in Table 3-5. The volume coefficient is a small figure. The figure must be 
small because it needs to be multiplied by the very large volume figure to arrive at the 
BAS, which itself is small value. The actual value of the figure is -0.000000002. This 
negative volume coefficient shows an inverse relationship between spread and amount 
traded. Both the volume and volatility results are statistically significant at the 1% and 
5% levels respectively. As in 3.7, the dummy variable is not statistically significant 
with the spread.  
 Equation 3.10 provides an extremely statistically significant result. The 
dummy variable and volatility are strongly statically significant at the 1% level. The 
volume is significant at the 10% level. This regression demonstrates with 
exceptionally high certainty that manipulation coincides with higher relative spreads, 
increased risk and smaller trading volume. This is a significant finding.  
 The first set of regressions highlights the explanatory power of the PBAS over 
the BAS. The increased relative spread being associated with manipulation confirms 
the suggested models in the literature where market participants build in an 
informational risk into spreads. Manipulation then, appears to increase transaction 
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3.5.2 Second Set of Regressions 
The second set of regressions uses volume as the dependent variable. Large 
coefficients were produced reflecting the relative size of volume data as compared 
with the data of the independent variables. The results do not find a level of statistical 
significance. Equation 3.11 regresses the volume onto the dummy variable. The 
resulting p-value is .9202 which suggests manipulation is not statistically significant 
with trading volume. Similarly the dummy explanatory variable in equations 3.12 and 
3.13 are not significant.  
 The second set of regressions finds statistically significant relationships 
between the volume and the explanatory variables except for the dummy. Equation 
3.12 and 3.13 provides negative coefficients for volatility suggesting that when stocks 
are more risky there is less trading volume. Volatility is significant at the 10% level. 
The BAS and PBAS also provide negative coefficients, which suggests that wider 
spreads result in lower trading volumes. The Volume/BAS relationship is highly 
significant at the 1% level. The volume/PBAS relationship is significant at 10% level. 
The worryingly implication of these finding is that market manipulation is possible 
both when volumes traded are high and low.  
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Table 3-5: Multivariate Regression Results for a 200 day event period  
This table reports results from the regressions, equations 3.9 to 3.15 over 200 days. The regressions are based on the 40 stock cases of market manipulation on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The ‘change’ explanatory variable represents the independent variable regressed onto the dichotomous value. ***,**, *  























  Intercept Change Volume Volatility  BAS  PBAS 
First Set of Regressions             
BAS (Control) 
Equation 3.7 0.0228 0.0015 
P-value      <0.0001*** 0.2641 
PBAS (Control) 
Equation 3.8 0.1137 0.0201 
    < 0.0001***      <0.0001*** 
BAS 
Equation 3.9 0.0221 0.0012 0.0000 0.0760 
     <0.0001*** 0.3622 0.0024***     0.0149** 
PBAS 
Equation 3.10 0.1026 0.0184 0.0000 0.3613 
     <0.0001***      <0.0001***   0.0568*      0.0001*** 
Second Set of Regressions             
Volume (Control) 
Equation 3.11 1341298 14348 
  <0.0001*** 0.9202 
Volume 
Equation 3.12 2113605 74906 -5688238 -22811549 
  <0.0001*** 0.5921 0.0891*   0.0024*** 
Volume 
Equation 3.13 2,160,311 139,884 -5,857,066 -4,922,246 
  <0.0001*** 0.3487   0.0915*   0.0568* 
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4. Conclusions 
This study is the first to empirically examine stock market manipulation cases on the 
HKSE. Stock market manipulation is observed to negatively impact market efficiency 
measures both at the time of manipulation and in the period following manipulation. 
The HSKE could not return to pre-manipulation efficiency measures.   
 Both the BAS and the PBAS are observed to widen at the time of 
manipulation and remain wide afterwards. This result accurately reflects the market 
microstructure assumption that information asymmetry risk is built into spreads by 
rational investors. Manipulation is also associated with increased volatility and 
reduced volume as investors exit the market rationally in fear of trading with a 
manipulator. The resulting impact of market liquidity, efficiency and integrity is 
negative.  The regressions strongly confirm these results with a high degree of 
significance.  
 Market prices were observed to rise following manipulation and remain 
consistently higher. This finding supports the asymmetric price responses first 
suggested by Allen and Gorton (1992). The worrying implication is that manipulation 
is both possible and profitable as trade-based manipulators are seemingly able to raise 
prices by trading and exit their positions at those artificially high prices. The results 
also found no justification to claims that larger traders are executed at unfavourable 
prices. This surprising result suggests the notion of trade size as a proxy for 
information asymmetry of Easely and O’Hara (1987) may be misplaced. Manipulators 
seemingly are able engage in large, profitable trades.   
 These results go some way to refuting the suggestion of Fischel and Ross 
(1991) that the legal notion of market manipulation should be dropped because it is 
always unprofitable and self-deterring. Instead, the results show that markets are not 
capable of efficiently responding to manipulation. Rational information-seeking 
investors who normally keep markets efficient may be the unfortunate victims of 
market manipulation. The results therefore provide an empirical justification as to 
why manipulation must continue to be prohibited by law and robustly and effectively 
prosecuted.   
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